Abstract This paper studies the existence of a competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information. There are two agents involved in the trading of the risky assets: an "informed" trader and an "ordinary" trader. The market is competitive and the ordinary agent can infer the insider information from the price dynamics of the risky assets. The insider information is considered to be the total supply of the risky assets. The definition of market equilibrium is based on the law of supply-demand as described by a rational expectations equilibrium of the Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70:393-408, 1980) model. We show that equilibrium can be attained by linear dynamics of an admissible price process of the risky assets for a given linear supply dynamics.
Introduction
In recent years, financial mathematicians have been focusing on the model of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information arises when agents in the market do not have the same information filtration. They generally make an assumption regarding the extra information that is accessible uniquely by the "informed trader" or the "insider trader". This extra information could be, for example, the future liquidation price of the risky assets. Using the results of enlargement of filtration first developed by Jeulin (1980) and then Jacod (1985) , many papers such as those of Grorud and Pontier (1998) and Amendinger et al. (1998) focused on solving utility maximization problems in a security market where two investors have different information levels. In these papers, the security prices are assumed to evolve according to an exogenous diffusion. In Hillairet (2004), different types of asymmetric information, including "initial strong", "progressive strong" and "weak" information are studied. However, the drawback of the above models is that "ordinary" or "uninformed" agents cannot infer the insider information.
On the other hand, in Kyle (1985) and Back (1992) , the market is competitive and the ordinary agents can obtain feedbacks from the market regarding the insider information. There have also been several other studies, published in the economic literature, on the impact of asymmetric information on stock price. The first such paper is the seminal paper of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , followed by those of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . In Biais and Rochet (1997), we may find a very insightful survey of the literature on these areas, including those cited above. In Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , the agents are competitive and market is Walrasian, i.e. price equals supply and demand. The only exogenous part of this model may come from irrational traders, often called noise traders. In Biais and Rochet (1997), the objective is to analyse the price formation in a dynamic version of Grossman and Stiglitz model where stochastic control techniques can be used.
In the same framework, in our paper, we consider a financial market consisting of an "ordinary" agent, an "informed" agent and noise traders. While the ordinary agent can only observe the price dynamics of the risky assets, the "informed" agent has also access to the total supply of the risky assets. As in Back (1992) , based on the observation of the price dynamics of the risky assets, "the ordinary" agent can infer the additional information of the "informed" agent. The purpose of the study is to see whether an equilibrium condition can be attained by linear dynamics of an admissible price process of the risky assets for a given linear supply dynamics. Like in the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the market is Walsarian, i.e. the agents involved in the market are competitive agents.
Our studies show that the existence of linear competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information is directly related to the existence of solution to some associated nonlinear equations. Indeed, the equilibrium condition can be explicitly expressed in the form of a system of nonlinear equations. However, we may not determine whether the associated system of nonlinear equations leads to a nonempty set of solution. We nevertheless find that in the particular case where the total supply is a Brownian motion, the equilibrium can be reached and we explicitly obtain the linear dynamics of an admissible price process.
The plan of the paper is organized as follows. We define the model and the equilibrium condition in Sect. 2, while in Sect. 3, we use stochastic control techniques and filtering theory to solve agents' CARA optimization problem and then determine their optimal trading portfolio. In Sects. 4, 5, we express the characterization of a potential
